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Language is grounded in our conceptual system. As argued by numerous 
authors (among others Kövecses 1986, 1990, 1995, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999), the study of meaning presents scholars with important clues to 
the cognitive organisation of knowledge underlying both our linguistic and non-
linguistic  behaviour.  Everyday  language  of  idioms,  metaphors,  metonymies, 
proverbs,  sayings,  collocations,  etc.  constitutes  a  rich  source  of  information 
about systems of cultural cognitive models which speakers of a language employ 
to make sense of the world they live in.  
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse lexical expressions pertaining to the 
domain of Insanity in English with a view to uncovering a cognitive model of 
Insanity which motivates them. The analysis will be based upon the assumption 
that lexical categories are organised conceptually around cognitive prototypes 
and  that  relations  inside  and  between  categories  are  cases  of  extension  of 
meaning from prototypes via metonymic and metaphorical mappings (see, for 
example, Lakoff 1987). The cognitive model of Insanity we arrive at will be 
shown not only to underlie our linguistic behaviour but also to play no small role 
in our understanding of and attitudes towards mental illness and the mentally ill. 
1. The Metonymies and Metaphors of Insanity 
At  first  sight,  the  terminology  used  to  talk  about  insanity  seems  rather 
opaque – an idea expressed in the following passage from literary criticism: 
 [I define madness] as a state of mind in which a character seriously confuses reality as most 
of us see it with what the character takes it to be. I prefer this as a working definition to vaguer 
notions like “being out of one’s mind,” or “being mentally deranged.” Definitions like [this] are 
question begging, in that we wonder what, in turn is meant by such a phrase. (Daalder 1997:105)  
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However, a closer look at lexical expressions of insanity reveals that, rather 
than functioning as arbitrary signs, they form systems of meaning motivated by 
the  underlying  conceptual  categories,  mostly  metaphors  and  metonymies, 
which are directly grounded in our bodily and cultural experience (Johnson 
1987, Lakoff 1987). 
Let  us  begin  our  discussion  by  examining  expressions  which  reflect  a 
cultural model of the Behavioural and Physiological Symptoms Of Insanity. 
People  who  are  considered  insane  are  typically  seen  as  very  active  and 
energetic.  They  display  agitated,  violent  behaviour,  moving  in  a  fast  and 
uncontrolled  way,  flailing  their  limbs,  often  screaming  and/or  laughing 
hysterically. Some of these patterns of behaviour can metonymically stand for 
Insanity. 
  
Agitated/Violent Behaviour Stands for Insanity  
He was hopping/screaming/spitting mad. 
Maddened by pain the horse went berserk kicking at the walls of his stable. 
In the film a man clutching a chain saw runs spectacularly amok. 
She went wild when she heard about it. 
He suddenly went psycho and started shooting in all directions. 
She had an attack of nerves. 
She’ll throw a fit/a tantrum when she sees that mess. 
She had hysterics when I told her what happened.  
 
People  suffering  from  mental  illnesses  are  also  seen  as  displaying 
characteristic Visual Behaviour, usually with their eyes and mouth wide open 
and/or a sort of contorted facial expression: 
 
Insane Visual Behaviour Stands for Insanity 
She had a wild look in her eyes. 
She was staring mad. 
He was grinning like mad. 
Those people looked really mad.  
The most pervasive characteristic of madness is, however, the fact that it 
impairs normal mental functioning. As a result of an illness, strong emotion, or 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, the brain stops working properly.    
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Impairment Of Normal Mental Functioning Stands for Insanity 
Ellen has been quite delirious with joy. 
He had delusions. 
She had auditory hallucinations. 
She’s seeing things. 
He’s got a bad case of the DTs. 
 
Because  of  the  lack  of  mental  control,  the  body  also  stops  functioning 
normally: 
 
Impairment Of Normal Physical Functioning Stands for Insanity 
He was foaming/frothing at the mouth. 
He was raving deliriously about something. 
He was a drivelling idiot. 
He had jim-jams. 
 
The fact that we perceive insanity as impairing the functioning of both the 
psyche and the body means that our conception of madness strongly depends 
on the way we perceive ourselves, our bodies and our minds. Therefore, before 
we  attempt  to  define  madness,  we  have  to  define  what  it  means  for  us  to 
function normally. 
We conceptualise our bodies as systems, i.e. functional units consisting of 
interconnected  and  interdependent  parts  (Johnson  1987:87).  For  any 
prototypical system to function normally certain conditions must be fulfilled. 
First,  the  parts  of  the  system  must  strike  a  balance  of  forces  (cf.  Johnson 
1987).  Second,  the  parts  have  to  be  unified.  Third,  a  system  has  to  be 
controlled.  
Conceptualisation  of  Insanity  seems  to  depend  heavily  on the  Body As 
System metaphor and the entailments it carries. Let us look at the notion of 
systemic balance first. In English there are expressions referring to insanity 
which are motivated by the conceptual metaphor: 
 
Insanity Is A Lack Of Balance  
He is totally unbalanced. 
I would describe her as mentally unstable. 
Anyone who saw us doing this would think we were off our trolleys.  
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Are you off your rocker? 
She suffered from mental dissolution.  
 
The  Mental  Balance  in  these  examples  is  conceptualised  in  terms  of  a 
Physical Balance of forces which lets us function in a normal way, for instance, 
prevents us from losing our footing or from losing chemical stability as in the 
‘mental dissolution’ example. Historically, the bodily balance was understood 
as the balance of humours in the organism. The imbalance of those substances 
was believed to be the cause of diseases, both of the body and the mind. The 
conception of mental disease itself is based on the metaphor The Mind Is A 
Body (Eve Sweetser 1990, cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1999:235–243), which 
entails that Thinking Is Physical Functioning and A Well Functioning Mind Is 
A  Healthy  Body.  If  Insanity  involves  Impairment  Of  Normal  Mental 
Functioning, then, metaphorically (and etymologically), Insanity Is A Disease:
1 
 
Insanity Is A Disease 
She is mentally ill. 
He has a diseased mind. 
She suffered from a mental sickness. 
Was she of sound mind at the time of the accident? 
He is insane. 
 
The System metaphor via which we conceptualise ourselves also entails 
that we are constructed out of parts.
2 Many lexical expressions connected with 
insanity refer to the idea of a person being separated from some important part 
of him/herself. Thus we can postulate a metaphorical scheme: 
 
1 The fact that the symptoms of  madness such as raving and delirium and the symptoms of 
bodily illnesses converge seems to contribute to the metaphor. 
2  Lakoff  and  Johnson,  for  example,  define  the  parts  as  the  Subject,  the  locus  of 
consciousness, subjective experience, reason, will, and our “essence”, everything that makes us 
who  we  uniquely  are  and  the  Self  or  Selves  representing  our  bodies,  our  social  roles,  our 
histories  (1999:269).    There  exists  a  Subject-Self  metaphor  schema  where  the  Self  is 
conceptualised as the Container for the Subject conceptualised as a person.  The Subject can 
control the Self only if it (the Subject) is in its normal location, i.e. inside the Container.  If the 
Subject is outside the Container, i.e. the parts of the system are no longer a unity, the Subject is 
out of control.  If we assume that the normal container for the Subject, i.e. our reason and 
consciousness,  is our mind or head, then we infer that if we are ‘out of our mind’ we are out of 
control of the Self (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).    
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Insanity Is A Lack of Unity  
Are you off your head/chump/nut? 
She was out of her mind with grief. 
I’m not in my right mind. 
He  was  dancing  in  wild  abandon.  He  abandoned  himself  completely  to  his 
feelings. 
Thou art estranged from thyself (Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors II, 2). 
Her poor demented sister had killed herself (on etymological grounds).  
 
The  system  cannot  function  normally  when  the  parts  are  scattered  or 
missing:  
 
He is scatter-brained. 
Those guys are really scatty. 
All your chairs are not pulled up to the table. 
You are a bit lacking upstairs. 
He’s lost his reason. 
She is completely bereft of reason. 
She’s suffering from mental deficiency.  
You are two tacos shy of a Mexican combination plate. 
You have a screw loose. 
  
The  metaphor  Insanity  Is  A  Lack  Of  (Systemic)  Unity  highlights  two 
important  aspects  of  madness.  First, it reflects  the fact  that  madness  impairs 
normal functioning of a person conceived as a system. Second, it shows that 
madness involves lack of control. 
Madness  is,  in  fact,  perceived  as  an  ultimate  lack  of  control,  which  is 
reflected in different metaphors with insanity as their target domain. Take, for 
instance, the Insanity Is A Force metaphor:  
 
Insanity Is A Force 
He is possessed.  
114
For that fine madness still he did retain, Which rightly should possess a poet’s 
brain (NPDQ, 148:16). 
Several cases of demonic possession have been reported in recent months. 
He’s been driven from sanity. 
He was utterly overwhelmed by madness. 
A royal madness has gripped our society.  
As the king’s madness takes hold, the state goes slowly into ruin. 
He’s touched. 
 
In many cultures trance-like states are considered to be cases of possession. 
Interestingly  enough,  two  words  in  English  which  originally  referred  to  the 
religious practice of ecstatic cults – berserker and whirling dervish – are now 
commonly used to refer to a crazy person (Kelley 1992:164). A similarity of 
symptoms between trance-like states and madness may be a good motivation for 
viewing madness as a result of the influence of some sort of a force. As the 
examples  demonstrate,  the  force  may  assume  different  forms.  It  may  be  a 
supernatural force such as a demon or a spirit, or a very strong emotion as in the 
following example from literary criticism:  
Lear feels himself overwhelmed by his own impulses and emotions. He struggles for psychic 
control, but his cry: “O! Let me not be mad, not mad sweet heaven; Keep me in temper; I would 
not be mad (I.V. 47–48) is an acknowledgement of unknown forces within which have begun to 
undermine his customary defences […]. (Feder 1980:124, emphases mine) 
 
Other types of influence are possible, especially the power of the natural 
forces – the Sun and the Moon, as in: midsummer madness and moon-struck 
lunacy.  
The  perception  of  insanity  as  a  force  brings  into  focus  the  following 
inferences. Firstly, possession of a person by the devil, or a demon indicates that 
the person who is insane is evil. This is frequently reflected in media portrayals 
of mad murderers, mad doctors, or mad scientists. Secondly, because the force 
which takes control of a person is usually a negative one, against which the 
person has to struggle, insanity is considered dangerous: 
 
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness (NPDQ, 178:27). 
And most of all would I flee from the cruel madness of love (ODQ, 535:38). 
Whom God wishes to destroy, he first makes mad (NPDQ, 160:1).  
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Can you [...] Get from him why he puts on this confusion, Grating so harshly all his 
days of quiet, With turbulent and dangerous lunacy? (Shakespeare, Hamlet III, 1). 
Until he is forced to recognise his terrible vulnerability by madness itself, Ajax 
has regarded himself omnipotent (Feder 1980:93). 
Future historians will recognise our divorce rate as collective madness, socially 
destructive, but necessary. 
He had an attack of nerves. 
 
Thirdly, since an insane person no longer has the control over him/herself, s/he is 
not responsible for his/her actions. This conception of madness has its reflection 
in legal procedures and legal language where a defendant may plead insanity to 
show that s/he was not totally responsible for what s/he had done. 
The notion of control is not only important for the way we deal with our 
internal world, but also, or rather primarily, it is important for our functioning in 
the external environment. People generally feel safe in their surroundings when 
they are in control of them. A civilised man tends to divide his world into two 
spheres:  the  ‘tame’  world  functioning  according  to  the  laws  established  by 
society, and the wilderness which is not controllable by social laws and which, 
therefore,  is  considered  dangerous.  This  knowledge  of  the  wild  world  is 
projected onto our inner lives (see Kövecses 1986). Each person is thought to 
have a Self which is conceptualised as a wild animal. It is the responsibility of 
any person to keep that Self under control. If the animal Self is let loose it 
becomes  dangerous  both  to  the  person  and  to  the  society. And,  as Kövecses 
(1986:23) puts it, the behaviour of a person who has lost control is the behaviour 
of a wild animal.  
 
Insane Behaviour Is Agitated Animal Behaviour  
Street crazies were howling at passers by like mad dogs. 
He was foaming at the mouth. 
He was dangerous, even barking mad. 
As mad as a buck/a cut snake/a wet hen/a hornet/a March hare. 
Mad as the baiting bull of Stanford. 
 
The insane are not capable of controlling themselves and this leads to the 
common  assumption  that  they  are  wild  and  hence  dangerous  to  the  society. 
Indeed, the word wild is often used interchangeably with the word mad in the 
sense ‘uncontrolled, dangerous or extreme’: 
  
116
She had a wild/mad look in her eyes. 
When I told him what I’d done, he went wild/mad. 
We were all wild/mad with excitement. 
Oh, Chris has always been wild/mad about Madonna. 
He was wildly/madly in love with her. 
 
Finally, the uncontrollability of insanity is emphasised in the metaphor: 
 
Insanity Is Chaos  
He suffered from mental derangement/disorder of reason/mental disorder. 
She wanted to come to terms with inner confusion/inner disturbance. 
A mind in conflict and distress. 
He was a mixed up kid. 
 
Chaos is a state of total confusion and lack of order (CID). Chaos in a 
system,  means  that the  system  is  disorganised  and cannot  function  normally. 
Disorder ensues typically due to lack of control. If we assume that the control of 
the mental processes is located in the Mind/Head/Brain and the ability to control 
something is conceived of in terms of power, then abnormal mental functioning 
can be understood as the weakening or loss of the power of the mind to control 
the system, as in: his reason was undermined or O, what a noble mind is here 
o’erthrown!  (Shakespeare,  Hamlet  III,  1).  The  power  is  often  construed  as 
physical strength: feebleness of mind; he’s weak in the head. If strength, in turn, 
is understood as hardness, as in He’s a tough guy, then softening of the brain 
means that the brain has no strength, i.e. no power to control the mental and 
physical functions of the organism. A similar idea is expressed in the saying to be 
bananas  which,  as  Dictionary  of  Contemporary  Slang  (1994:25)  asserts, 
probably originated in the notion of softness in the head. 
2. The Prototype 
As  mentioned  before,  metonymies  and  metaphors  contribute  to  the 
understanding of a concept by highlighting some of its aspects. Those aspects, 
which are cognitively most salient, form a cognitive model of the concept. The 
model of Insanity presented here is a prototypical one. It is a social stereotype 
which incorporates our cultural expectations about the causes, characteristics, 
and effects of insanity.  
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The prototypical cognitive model of Insanity 
i. Causes:  
Insanity is caused by brain damage/strong emotion/influence of alcohol or 
drugs/influence of supernatural powers. 
ii. Behavioural and Physiological Symptoms:  
A Person who is insane displays Agitated and Violent Behaviour as well as 
Insane Visual Behaviour. 
Insanity impairs normal mental functioning of a Person.  
Insanity impairs normal physical functioning of a Person. 
iii. Characteristics of Insanity:  
The Person who is insane loses control over him/herself. 
The Person is not responsible for his/her actions. 
Insanity is dangerous to the Person who is mad. 
The insane Person is dangerous to the society. 
Insanity is evil.  
The insane Person is evil. 
 
Now, two questions arise concerning the explanatory force of a model like 
the  one  drawn  above.  The  first  is  how  the  model  actually  shapes  our 
understanding of the concept of Insanity, i.e. how and to what extent it influences 
our perception of insanity and the insane, which is a question about its value as a 
cultural model. The second question is how it helps us account for the ways we 
talk about insanity, which is a question about the relation between the lexical and 
the conceptual structure. We partly answered the first question stating that the 
cognitive  model  of  insanity  is  a  social  stereotype  which  incorporates  and 
simultaneously shapes our expectations about mental illness and the mentally ill. 
Employing a cognitive model like this may be a way of protecting ourselves 
against dangerous realities. As Gilman puts it succinctly in his book Seeing the 
Insane (cited in Wahl 1995:126),   
The mad, especially in the incarnation of the aggressive mad, are one of the most common 
focuses for the general anxiety felt by all members of society, an anxiety tied to the perceived 
tenuousness of life. If I am afraid that I am to be attacked, have my goods stolen, loose my status in 
society, I do not want this fear to be universal, pervading every moment of my life. I want to know 
who is going to steal my hard-won status. [...] Our response to the perceived aggressiveness of the 
mad [...] reassures us. We have localised the source of our fear. We know who is dangerous. We 
respond correctly and we have control over our world.  
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 3.  Elaborations and Extensions of the Prototype 
Let us now concentrate on the second question, i.e. the question of the link 
between the lexicon and cognition. As argued by some authors (among others 
Kövecses  1986),  lexical  items  are  defined  relative  to  semantic  fields,  i.e. 
categories of concepts with a prototype in the centre (141). The intracategorial 
and intercategorial relations between concepts underlying lexical items are based 
on the similarity relation to the central model. In what follows we look at some 
aspects of the organisation of the semantic field of  Insanity and discuss two 
kinds of meaning relations between lexical items: collocability and polysemy.  
3.1. Collocability 
Expressions like mad-afraid, mad-blazing, mad-drunk are based on the part 
of the cognitive model which refers to the Causes of Insanity. In the first two 
items it is strong emotion that results in madness, in the last one madness is the 
result of the influence of alcohol. However, how such collocations work exactly 
needs  further  explanation.  As  Kövecses  (1986:130–131)  writes,  collocation 
involves the set of different words that a particular word can combine with […] 
[and] the collocational range of a word is in part determined by which other 
concept(s)  the  word  (more  precisely,  the  corresponding  concept)  is  used  to 
conceptualise.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  question  of  the  extent  to  which  the 
cognitive models of the collocating words overlap. The key to why the word mad 
goes together with the words: afraid, blazing, and drunk seems to be that the 
cognitive models standing behind all those words incorporate an intensity scale. 
When we said earlier in this paper that madness is considered the ultimate loss of 
control, we implied that controllability is a graded phenomenon. Emotions and 
drunkenness also have their intensity scales, where there is a certain limit beyond 
which their physiological effects impair normal functioning of an organism (cf. 
Kövecses 1986:88). This, in turn, means that a person who is too emotional or 
too drunk suffers from a complete loss of control. Such an overlap between the 
cognitive models of concepts is responsible for the combinability of the words 
expressing those concepts.  
3.2. Polysemy 
Indeed, the prototypical cognitive model not only enables us to see how a 
single  semantic  field,  such  as  Insanity,  is  structured,  but  it  also  shows  links 
between  semantic  fields.  If  we  look  up  the  words  madness,  madman,  mad, 
madly, and madden in a dictionary, we will see that they have multiple meanings  
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which go beyond the domain of Mental Illness. Let us consider a few examples 
of concepts which can be expressed by means of those words: 
Enthusiasm and Love: Jane’s mad about Italian food. After twenty years of 
marriage they are still mad about each other. His girls had no way of telling 
love’s madness from insanity.  
Anger: You’d better avoid him, he’s mad as hell at you. It maddens me to see 
how unfairly John has been treated. 
Intensity: She was madly in love with him. He was working like mad to get 
enough money to go on holidays. He drives like a madman.  
Foolishness, Stupidity: Ben’s got some mad idea to cross the Atlantic in a 
canoe. To begin a war would be sheer madness.  
Concepts such as Enthusiasm, Love, Anger, Intensity, and Foolishness can 
be understood in terms of Insanity due to the perceived similarity between the 
cognitive  models  standing  behind  those  concepts.  Emotion  concepts,  for 
instance,  have  an  implicit  intensity  scale  designating  a  limit  beyond  which 
normal functioning and self-control are no longer possible. Our knowledge of 
insanity  as  impairing  normal  functioning  of  our  organisms  and  involving  a 
complete loss of control allows for a mapping of the concept of Insanity onto the 
concepts of Enthusiasm and Love. The presence of the intensity scale in the 
mapping is expressed explicitly in the saying Mirth without measure is madness. 
The mechanism that stands behind polysemy here is a metaphoric extension from 
the prototypical cognitive model of Insanity to the domains of Enthusiasm and 
Love. Let us take the metaphorical mapping Love Is Insanity as an example. 
Apart from the aspects of lack of control and impairment of normal functioning, 
the metaphor highlights the fact that the person who is in love is not responsible 
for his/her actions. Rather, love is a force that makes them do things as in the 
following quotation: If thou rememberst not the slight folly, That ever love did 
make, Thee run into, Thou hast not loved (NPDQ 344:33). Love may also be 
dangerous to the person who is in love: And most of all would I flee from the 
cruel madness of love (ODQ 535:38). Some contexts may hide certain aspects of 
the source domain. In the example: My love’s a noble madness (ODQ 191:15), 
the aspects of evil, violence and dangerousness of madness are downplayed.  
The metaphor Anger Is Insanity
3 in a similar way emphasises the fact that 
Anger Involves Loss of Control and Impairment Of Normal Functioning as well 
as the fact that The Person Who Is Angry is Dangerous To Others (cf. Kövecses 
1986). The metaphor Anger is Insanity is expressed explicitly in the following 
sayings: Rage is brief insanity; Anger is short madness; Anger begins with folly 
and ends with prayer. As Kövecses (1986:20) writes, this metaphor is based on 
[t]he overlap between the folk theories of the effects of anger and the effects of 
insanity. By virtue of this metaphor, the Agitated and Violent Behaviour which 
 
3 This metaphor stands behind the central sense of the word mad  in American English.  
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metonymically stands for Insanity can also stand for Anger as in the following 
examples:  He  was  hopping  mad;  She  had  hysterics  when  I  told  her  what 
happened; She’ll have a fit when you tell her about it. Again, the intensity scale 
implicit  in  the  cognitive  model  of  Insanity  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
mapping. According to Kövecses (1986:22) in the Anger Is Insanity metaphor, 
insanity is understood as a highly energised state, with insane behaviour as a 
form  of  energy  output.  For  example,  when  we  say  that  somebody  is  brain-
boilingly mad, we employ the image of madness as a state of very high intensity, 
where the intensity scale is the heat scale and the highest point on the scale is the 
state of boiling.  When  the  words  from  the  domain  of  Insanity  are  used  to 
indicate intensity, they profile metonymically the intensity aspect of the whole 
model. For example: Kate Mitchell’s production […] has a manic depressive 
intensity,  a  madness  just  beneath  the  skin  of  sense. The  association  between 
madness  and  intensity  may  be  experientially  motivated  by  our  perception  of 
people  who  are  mentally  ill  as  very  active,  agitated,  moving  in  a  fast  and 
uncontrolled way. For example, the expression to do something like mad is likely 
to have acquired its sense ‘to do something as quickly as you can’ (e.g.: She ran 
like mad to catch the bus) due to just this kind of association.  
  4. Conclusion 
The cultural model of Insanity presented in this paper encompasses only a 
fraction of our actual knowledge of this domain. Nonetheless, the analysis seems 
to  confirm  the  idea,  promoted  in  other  studies  of  a  similar  character,  that 
meaning and meaning relations are largely dependent on cognitive structures and 
schemata such as prototypical models, metaphors and metonymies. Moreover, 
this paper shows that language and culture appear to be based on and motivated 
by the same sort of cognitive models. This means our ways of talking can tell us 
a lot about our understanding of and attitudes towards the social and cultural 
world we talk about. 
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